A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect signal determining the value of the object to both players, while the buyer remains uninformed. We analyze the infinite horizon bargaining game in which the buyer makes all the offers. When the static incentive constraints permit first-best efficiency, then under some regularity conditions the outcome of the sequential bargaining game becomes arbitrarily efficient as bargaining frictions vanish. When the static incentive constraints preclude first-best efficiency, the limiting bargaining outcome is not second-best efficient, and may even perform worse than the outcome from the one-period bargaining game. With frequent buyer offers, the outcome is then characterized by recurring bursts of high probability of agreement, followed by long periods of delay in which the probability of agreement is negligible.
Introduction
One of the most vexing problems in economics is why rational parties have such a difficult time reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Even a casual glance at the evidence shows that bargaining inefficiencies abound. These inefficiencies take on many forms : failure to reach agreement when gains of trade exist (e.g., lawsuits that go to trial), delays in reaching agreement (e.g., labor disputes such as strikes or work slowdowns (Cramton and Tracy, 1992) ), the build-up of significant expenses in brokering an agreement (e.g., lawyer fees), and settling on contractual terms that fail to fully realize all gains from trade.
1 Ever since Hicks (1932) , economists have wondered why the bargaining parties do not simply avoid such inefficiencies by settling immediately at the terms they expect to eventually arrive at.
While some other theories have been advanced, 2 the most popular explanation for the existence of bargaining inefficiencies is that the parties lack information about an aspect critical to reaching agreement. If this information is privately held, active negotiation may be necessary in order to reveal the range of agreements that are acceptable to all parties. For example, when approaching a seller of a piece of real estate, a potential buyer may not know the minimal offer the seller would be willing to accept. The buyer can of course estimate the seller's reservation value, but may fail in his negotiations unless he makes an offer that even a seller with a high reservation value would accept.
Such an offer is generally not optimal from the buyer's viewpoint, so some delay will necessarily result. From the viewpoint of the literature on incomplete information bargaining, this delay is not only a necessary evil, but acts as a useful device by which the parties can credibly convey the strength of their bargaining positions. A seller who repeatedly rejects offers and leaves his house on the market for a long time can credibly signal to the buyer that he is not eager to sell.
Unfortunately, this elegant explanation for bargaining inefficiencies has come under recent attack from the literature on the Coase Conjecture (Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985) , Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) ). The Coase Conjecture literature studies the simplest asymmetric information bargaining problem, in which a seller with known valuation makes repeated price offers 1 Indeed, the screening literature explains distortions in contractual terms as an attempt to minimize informational rents.
2 For example, Fernandez and Glazer (1991) develop a complete information bargaining model in which, following rejection of management's wage offer, workers can either strike or continue to work at the existing wage. Because management is not indifferent between these responses, there exists a multiplicity of equilibria involving immediate settlement, but differing in the agreed upon wage. This multiplicity in turn permits equilibria involving delay in agreement.
for the sale of a single unit of an indivisible asset to a buyer whose valuation for the asset is private information. According to the Coase Conjecture, if there is no restraint on the rate at which the seller can make price offers, then in the limit as the length of the time period between successive offers vanishes, the seller will offer the good for sale at the lowest possible buyer valuation.
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In other words, bargaining inefficiencies can be explained only by exogenous limitations on the rate at which offers can be revised. While there are undoubtedly some practical limitations on the speed at which parties can formulate and interpret offers, these limitations are unlikely to be of a magnitude sufficient to explain significant bargaining failures, such as protracted strikes or the huge costs associated with major corporate lawsuits.
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As a consequence, the Coase Conjecture questions the usefulness of asymmetric information as an explanation for bargaining inefficiencies.
If we are to retain asymmetric information as a foundation for the theory of bargaining, there appear to be two possible avenues. First, we can question the validity of the Coase Conjecture.
One line of argument here maintains that concerns for reputation may guide player's behaviors.
Papers in this vein are Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) , who abandon the stationarity assumption driving the Coase Conjecture, and Myerson (1991, pp. 399-402) and Abreu and Gul (2000) , who develop a psychological theory of bargaining. Another line of argument questions the validity of backward induction, either on the basis of experimental evidence (Neelin, Sonnenschein and Spiegel (1988) ), or on theoretical grounds (Binmore (1988) , Reny (1993) , Rosenthal (1981 ), Samet (1996 ). Secondly, we can question the appropriateness of the one-sided incomplete information private values model. For example, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) show that in the twosided incomplete information private values model inefficiency necessarily occurs in any sequential equilibrium of any bargaining game, provided the supports of the distribution of buyer and seller type are not separated. Unfortunately, extensive models with two-sided incomplete information are very hard to analyze, and at present very little is known about their outcomes.
In the current paper, we instead investigate the consequences of allowing interdependencies in player's valuations, but retain the relative simplicity and elegance of the one-sided incomplete information model. We believe this is a fruitful area for investigation because many real world bargaining problems involve such interdependencies. For example, in lawsuits involving the health 3 More precisely, this statement holds if the lowest possible buyer valuation strictly exceeds the seller's valuation, and a mild technical is satisfied (Analogous to assumptions (1) and (2) in the body of the current paper). The Coase
Conjecture also holds without these assumptions, provided attention is restricted to stationary equilibria. 4 For a particularly striking example of the latter, see Cutler and Summers (1988) .
hazards of a manufacturer's product, or the environmental consequence of a production method, the manufacturer may have private information regarding the safety of his product or the risks associated with his production method that is relevant to the welfare of potential victims. Similarly, when negotiating the sale of an oil tract, the buyer may possess survey information regarding the richness of the underlying deposit that is relevant to the owner's willingness to sell. And in wage bargaining, the worker may have superior knowledge about his level of human capital or productivity. This level not only affects the worker's value to his current employer, but also his value to alternative employers, and hence his reservation value of staying with his current employment.
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We consider an environment in which there is a single seller bargaining over the terms at which to trade a single unit of an indivisible good. The seller receives a signal q ∈ [0, 1] determining his reservation value c. The signal also affects the buyer's valuation v, but the buyer is uninformed about the realization of the signal. A prototypical example of this situation arises in the market for used cars, where the seller may have information regarding the reliability of the car that is relevant to the buyer, but not easily verifiable. Ever since the pioneering work of Akerlof (1970) , economists have been aware that such an environment can generate trading inefficiencies. Indeed, if trade is to be efficient, the buyer's expected value from trading must exceed the reservation value of the seller of the most reliable car, for otherwise there exists no price at which both are willing to trade. Assuming the seller's cost to be increasing in q, inefficiencies will therefore necessarily occur whenever this condition is violated, i.
e. E(v) < c(1).
We study the welfare performance of the infinite horizon bargaining game in which the uninformed party (the buyer) makes all the offers. The literature on the Coase Conjecture analyzes a special case of this model, in which the buyer's valuation does not depend upon the seller's signal. Does the uninformed party's incentive to accelerate trade still operate so as to select a limiting outcome that is second-best efficient?
Our paper brings both good and bad news. We prove that when the static incentive constraints permit first-best efficiency, and v(·) is increasing, then as in the private values case, the outcome of the sequential bargaining game becomes arbitrarily efficient when bargaining frictions are allowed to vanish. At the same time, we also show that whenever the static incentive constraints preclude first-best efficiency, the Coase Conjecture forces select a limiting outcome that does not maximize the expected gains from trade. Finally, we show that when the informed party can make frequent offers, the bargaining outcome is characterized by recurring bursts of high probability of agreement, followed by long periods of delay in which the probability of agreement is negligible.
The two papers most closely related to the present one are Evans (1989) and Vincent (1989) .
Evans considers a two-type example in which the buyer and seller differ only in their valuation for the high quality car, and studies the impact of relative discount factors on the bargaining outcome. 6 Vincent allows much more general interdependencies in valuations, and introduces an assumption guaranteeing existence of a Bayesian equilibrium. He also provides a two-type example demonstrating the possibility of limiting delay.
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Neither of these papers, however, provides a characterization of the limiting bargaining outcome, or delineates necessary and sufficient conditions for delay to be present. They also do not explain how and why the Coase Conjecture forces operate during the bargaining process, or determine the key factors influencing the length of delay.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and explains the notion of stationary equilibrium. Section 3 presents a simple two-type example that provides intuition for our main results. Section 4 proves general existence of stationary equilibrium and, under some (mild) regularity conditions, uniqueness of the supporting stationary triplet. Section 6 Unfortunately, with equal discount factors Evans' model becomes rather degenerate : when the fraction of high quality cars falls below a critical threshold, every incentive compatible trading mechanism necessarily generates no surplus. Meanwhile, when the threshold fraction is exceeded, a single take-it-or-leave it offer already leads to an efficient outcome. 7 However, Vincent's example satisfies the condition E(v) < c(1), so that every Nash equilibrium of every bargaining game necessarily exhibits inefficiency.
5 provides a general characterization of the limiting equilibrium outcome as the discount factor between successive buyer offers approaches 1. Section 6 proves that this outcome is not secondbest efficient when E(v) < c(1), and briefly presents the analogous model in which the buyer is the informed party, with the seller making the offers. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to three appendices, unless otherwise noted.
The Model
A buyer and a seller bargain over the terms at which to trade a single unit of an indivisible good.
The value of the good to each trader is determined by the realization of a random variable q
More precisely, the signal q respectively determines buyer and seller valuations through the functions v(·) and c(·) :
The functions v(·) and c(·) are required to be bounded and measurable.
We assume that one of the traders, the seller, is informed about the realization of the signal, while his bargaining partner, the buyer, only knows the distribution of the signal. right-continuous at q = 0. We also make an assumption of economic significance, namely that it is common knowledge amongst traders that the gains from trade are bounded away from zero :
8 See Section 6 for the analogous model in which the seller is the uninformed party. Assumption 1 implies that the extreme form of inefficiency described by Akerlof (1970) never occurs. 10 However, unlike in the private values case, the existence of a "gap" (Assumption 1) no longer guarantees that first best efficiency is attainable. Specifically, we have :
Proof : First best efficiency requires that all seller types q trade with probability one. This implies that the expected transfer must be independent of the seller's type (otherwise any seller type would want to mimic the type that receives the highest expected transfer). Denoting this transfer by t, seller individual rationality for type q = 1 requires that t ≥ c(1). Since the buyer's expected utility from participating in the mechanism equals E(v(q))−t, buyer individual rationality
The bargaining protocol we wish to analyze in this paper is the infinite horizon bargaining game in which the uninformed party makes all the offers. In this game, there are an infinite number of time periods, indexed by n = 0, 1, 2, .... In each period n in which bargaining has not yet concluded, the buyer starts by offering the seller a price p ∈ R + at which trade is to occur. Upon observing this offer, the seller can accept, in which case trade occurs at the proposed price and the game ends, or the seller can reject, in which case play moves to the next period. Note that each terminal node of the game can be identified with a pair (p, n). We assume that the traders are impatient and discount surplus at the common rate r > 0. Let ζ be the length of the time interval between two successive buyer offers, and δ = e −rζ the (common) discount factor. Then the terminal payoffs at node (p, n) are δ n (v (q) − p), for the buyer, and δ n (p − c(q)), for the seller.
In every period n, the information set of the buyer can be identified with a history of rejected offers, (p 0 , p 1 , ..., p n−1 ). A pure behavioral strategy for the buyer therefore specifies, in every period n, her current offer as a function of the n-history of rejected prices. Similarly, in every period n, the information set of the seller can be identified with the same history concatenated with the current offer, (p 0 , p 1 , ..., p n−1 , p n ). Let A denote acceptance of an offer, and R denote rejection of an offer.
A pure behavioral strategy for the seller specifies for each period n a decision in the set {A, R}, as a function of his type q, and as a function of the history (p 0 , p 1 , ..., p n−1 , p n ).
10 Assumption 1 implies that there always exists a feasible mechanim in which trade occurs with positive probability.
Indeed, consider the mechanism in which all seller types in [0, ε] Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson, 1986) . Furthermore, as we shall demonstrate in Section 4, under the assumption of a "gap", as far as equilibrium outcomes is concerned, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to stationary equilibrium outcomes. 12 Strictly speaking, this reasoning is only correct if P (q) is strictly increasing in q (as will be the case when c(·)
is strictly increasing in q, see equation (3) below). If P (·) has a flat segment, and q is not the endpoint of this segment, then by charging P (q ) the buyer induces more acceptances than indicated in (1). However, in this case it is straightforward to show that the maximum in (1) is never attained on the interior of the flat segment (the buyer always prefers to induce the largest state consistent with the offer P (q )). The extra freedom allowed in (1), by letting the seller select the state rather than the price, is therefore without consequence. 
Let Υ(q) denote the argmax correspondence in (2). By the Generalized Theorem of the Maximum (Ausubel and Deneckere, 1993) Υ is a nonempty-and compact-valued upper hemicontinuous correspondence, and the value function R(·) is continuous. Since the objective function in (2) has increasing differences in (q , q), Υ is a nondecreasing correspondence, and hence single-valued at all but at most a countable set of q.
In equilibrium, the seller's acceptance decision must be optimal given the buyer's offer behavior, as described by (2). To see the implications of this requirement, define t(q) = min Υ(q); then we must have 13 :
In other words, seller type q is indifferent between accepting the price P (q) and waiting one period for the (higher) offer P (t(q)).
The triplet {P (·), R(·), t(·)} determines a stationary equilibrium path in the following way. In the initial period, the buyer selects (possibly randomly) an offer P (q), for some q ∈ Υ(0). Following this offer, all seller types in the interval [0, q] accept, and all seller types in (q, 1] reject. Since it is necessarily the case that q > 0, Equation (3) implies that following rejection of the offer P (q) the seller must necessarily come back with the offer P (t(q)), even if Υ(q) is not single-valued. While the buyer may thus randomize in her initial offers, subsequent buyer offers are uniquely determined.
Following the offer P (t(q)), all seller types in the interval (q, t(q)] accept, and all seller types in the interval (t(q), 1] reject. This process then continues : in case of rejection, the buyer raises her offer to P (t 2 (q)), inducing all seller types in the interval (t(q), t 2 (q)] to accept, and so on, until the state 13 Note that t(q) is continuous at any point q where T (q) is single-valued. Now consider any point q ∈ [0, 1] at which the functions c(·), P (·) and P (t(·)) are continuous; since all of these functions are increasing, this excludes at most a countable number of q. For any nonexcluded q, if the buyer induces the state q by offering P (q), then since T is single-valued at q, the seller will necessarily offer P (t(q)) in the next period. For seller type q to be willing to accept P (q) it must therefore be the case that P (q) − c(q) ≥ δ(P (t(q)) − c(q)). But if we had strict inequality, and the seller offered a price slightly below P (q), seller type q would still strictly prefer to accept, contradicting the fact that P (q) is a reservation price. Consequently, for any non-excluded point q equation (3) 
where α, β, and s are strictly positive (see Figure 1 ). As noted above, when the buyer's valuation function v(·) is constant, we obtain the private values model as a special case. In the present example, this translates to the condition that α = s + β.
We will start by using backward induction to construct the stationary equilibrium, and then use
the explicit solution to both analyze the extent of the equilibrium limiting delay, and the economic forces that underlie it. Our derivation proceeds at an intuitive level.
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Observe first that the buyer's final equilibrium offer must be equal to the highest possible seller cost, c(1) = s. Any lower offer would not be accepted by all remaining seller types, while any offer greater than c(1) would be accepted with probability one, and hence dominated. Suppose now that in equilibrium there are n periods of bargaining remaining before the game concludes. Since seller types with valuation s do not accept until the final round, the offer in the current round, p n , will have to keep seller types with valuation 0 indifferent between accepting in that round and waiting
The triplet {P (·), R(·), t(·)} also describes the equilibrium continuation following nonequilibrium buyer offers p
: all seller types whose reservation price falls below p accept, and all other types reject. If q is the induced state, and the offer satisfies the equation p = P (q), then following rejection the buyer raises her offer to P (t(q)). If p is not in the range of the function P (·), so that we have p > P (q), then following rejection of p the buyer randomizes between the minimum and maximum elements of P (T (q)) so as to rationalize type q's acceptance of the previous offer p. Note that the latter type of offer will never arise along the equilibrium path, for the buyer could have lowered her offer to P (q), and still have induced the same acceptances.
15 Deneckere (1992) uses a similar procedure to compute an explicit equilibrium for the two-type independent private values model. n more periods to receive the final offer s, i.e.
where q n−1 denotes the highest buyer type whose acceptance price is p n , and where we use the convention that q −1 = 1 and q 0 =q. To determine the sequence of cutoff levels {q n }, we must consider the buyer's optimization problem. When the state is q 1 , the buyer must be indifferent between offering p 0 = s, which all remaining seller types accept, and offering p 1 = sδ, which all seller types in (q 1 , q 0 ] accept, and returning in the next period with the final offer p 0 . Letting
denote the period n ex-ante probability of agreement, we therefore have :
. Similarly, when n > 1, at the state q n the buyer must be indifferent between making the offer p n , which will be accepted by all seller types in (q n , q n−1 ], and making the next higher offer p n−1 , which will be accepted by all seller types in (q n , q n−2 ], i.e.
R(q
Solving for m n from (6) yields sδ
using the middle expression in (6) for R(q n−2 ) and the right-hand expression in (6) for R(q n−1 ),
. Combining the last two equations then produces a difference equation in m n :
Defining ρ = α s , we may solve this difference equation by forward recursion, using the boundary
Let us write m n (δ) to explicitly denote the dependence of the solution in (8) on δ, and let
For simplicity, assume that we are in the generic case where
We may then summarize the solution as follows :
by (7), and let p n be defined by (5) . Then for all δ < 1 the unique stationary triplet is given by :
According to Proposition 1, the buyer starts out by offering p N −1 , which all seller types in
Upon rejection, the buyer raises her offer to p N −2 , which is accepted by all seller
, and so on until the state q 0 is reached, at which point the seller makes her final offer p 0 = s. Bargaining therefore lasts for N (δ) periods.
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We are interested in the behavior of the above solution as δ converges to 1. To gain some insight into this question, let us first consider the case where ρ ≥ 1. Note that this case includes the private values model, where ρ = 1 + β s > 1. The economic significance of the inequality ρ ≥ 1 is that it implies α > sδ n = p n for all n ≥ 1, so that at any point in the game the buyer always expects to earn a positive surplus if her offer p n is accepted. As we work backwards from the terminal state, the buyer's expected discounted surplus therefore grows, i.e. R(
Since the buyer trades off gains from increased price discrimination against delayed receipt of the continuation value, she will therefore become more reluctant to price discriminate as n increases.
Thus, the acceptance probability is higher in earlier stages of the bargaining process; formally this is reflected in the fact that m n > m n−1 for all n > 1. Note that this inequality immediately implies that the number of bargaining rounds N (δ) is finite, and uniformly bounded in δ. 17 It follows that the Coase Conjecture holds, for if bargaining can last for at most N rounds, the initial price is no lower than δ N −1 s, and hence converges to s = c(1) as δ → 1. We conclude that when ρ ≥ 1 the solution behaves qualitatively exactly like in the private values case.
When ρ < 1, however, the equilibrium takes on a different character from the private values case. Indeed, with ρ < 1, it is always the case that when δ is sufficiently close to 1 there exists an 16 In the nongeneric case where P N i=1 m i (δ) = 1, the buyer may randomize between the initial offers p N and p N −1 , so that bargaining can last for one additional period.
initial range of integers n ≥ 1 for which α < sδ n . For such n the buyer expects to earn a negative surplus when the seller accepts her offer p n . Working backwards from the state q 0 , the buyer's expected profits are decreasing in n, as long as the inequality α < sδ n−1 continues to hold. Since the buyer trades off gains from increased price discrimination against delayed receipt of the continuation value, she will therefore become more eager to price discriminate as n increases. Formally, this is reflected in the fact that the ex-ante acceptance probability m n is decreasing in n. Importantly, observe that when δ approaches 1, the number of time periods over which the inequality α < sδ
holds increases without bound as the discount factor approaches 1. Consequently, unlike in the private values case, real delay may occur, even in the limit, as bargaining frictions are allowed to vanish.
To determine whether or not real delay occurs, let us calculate a =
we can defineN = min{n :
Bargaining then lasts no more thanN periods, regardless of the discount factor δ. As observed above, the Coase Conjecture then holds. This is true despite the fact that when ρ < 1, for large δ the acceptance probability m n is decreasing in n (1 < n ≤N ). If a = 1, the number of bargaining rounds is finite for any δ < 1, but increases without bound as δ → 1. Nevertheless, as Proposition 2 below shows, the Coase Conjecture holds for this case as well. Some simple computations show that the condition a ≥ 1 is equivalent to the condition E(v) ≥ c(1). 19 We conclude that in the two-type model the Coase Conjecture holds if and only if the static incentive constraints permit an efficient outcome (see Lemma (1)). When a < 1, then in the limit the backward construction "gets stuck" at the quantity q * = 1−a.
The reason for this is straightforward. By the definition of a, for any q > q * there exists an n < ∞ such that for all δ < 1 we have
For any such state, it will take no more than n periods before the buyer makes her final offer, independently of the discount factor δ. Thus for any state q > q * , the Coase Conjecture applies, yielding the buyer a limiting expected surplus Figure 2 : the buyer makes an expected loss of (s − α) on every trade in (q * ,q), and an expected gain of β on every trade in (q, 1). The point q * is such that the buyer's loss on the interval (q * ,q) is equal to the profit on the interval (q, 1). In other words, the buyer's limiting expected revenue is equal to zero at q * , R(q * ) = 0. Consequently, the buyer's incentive to accelerate trade vanishes at q * .
18 Note that when ρ ≥ 1, we have a = ∞, so that in this case the inequality a > 1 always holds.
19 Indeed, for ρ < 1 we have a = m 0 (1 + β s
In fact, real delay must necessarily occur at the state q * . The buyer must expect to make a profit from trading with seller types q < q * , i.e. trade at a price p ≤ α. Those types must prefer accepting p immediately to waiting to receive the final offer c(1) = s, necessitating real delay. One of the main breakthroughs in this paper is to figure out exactly how much delay there must be at the state q * . To this end, define τ such that a seller with valuation 0 is indifferent between accepting the offer α and waiting a length of time τ to receive the offer s, i.e. α = e −rτ s. Proposition 2 below
shows that the limiting delay must equal 2τ . The reason for the doubling of τ is the symmetry of the situation. This symmetry can be most easily seen if for each n we select δ such that ρδ −n = 1, so that p n = α. It then follows from equation (7) 
We conclude that it takes as much time to go from q n − ε to q n as it does to go from q n to q n + ε. Observe that lim δ→1 q n = q * , 20 and hence that the limiting real delay to move from q n to q n + ε is equal to τ . It follows that the limiting acceptance price of type
To complete the description of the limiting outcome when a < 1, observe that for q < q * the buyer's limiting continuation surplus is strictly positive (it is no lower than α − ρ 2 s). As a consequence, the buyer has an incentive to accelerate trade, and the Coase Conjecture again applies : for any ε > 0 there exists n < ∞ such that regardless of the discount factor it takes no more than n steps for the buyer to trade with type q. We therefore have : The two-type example shows us that it is the possibility of ex-post buyer regret (i.e., the buyer's expectation to earn a negative surplus should her offer be accepted) that slows down the bargaining.
This slowdown may or may not be sufficiently strong to produce limiting delay. Whether the Coase Conjecture holds, and thus whether there is no limiting delay, depends on whether the (1) continuation value remains bounded away from zero. However, there exists a state q * = 1 − a for which the limiting continuation value converges to zero. Near this state, the incentive to price discriminate remains strong as the discount factor converges to one, allowing real delay to occur.
As a consequence, when δ is near one, the bargaining outcome is characterized by two short time periods during which there is a high probability of agreement, interspersed with a long period of delay in which the probability of agreement is negligible. The length of the delay is increasing in
Intuitively, it would appear that many of these properties do not depend on there being just two types. However, there might now be more than one location in which there is limiting delay. It is also unclear whether the length of the limiting delay can still be determined for general cost and valuation functions, and whether it will depend more intricately on the global structure of those functions (rather than just c(q * ), v(q * ) and c (1)). We address these questions in the next two sections.
Existence and Uniqueness
For the special case of private values, Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) demonstrate that there exists a unique stationary triplet, and that all sequential equilibrium outcomes are the outcomes of some stationary equilibrium, provided that Assumptions 1 holds and the seller's cost function satisfies a Lipschitz condition at q = 1:
Theorem 1 below generalizes the Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson result to the case of interdependent values. The key step in establishing uniqueness of the stationary triplet is to show that there exists a critical value of the state q 1 < 1, such that in any sequential equilibrium, whenever the state exceeds q 1 , the buyer must make an offer that all remaining seller types will accept (see Lemmas A-1 and A-2 in Appendix A). This uniquely pins down a stationary triplet (R, t, P ) on the interval [q 1 , 1]. We then use backward induction on the state, employing the functional equations (2) and (3), to successively extend the triplet (R, t, P ) to the entire interval [0, 1].
Our construction differs from the one in Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) in two crucial ways. First, our extension is maximal in the sense that we construct a decreasing sequence of cutoff levels {q n } with the property that for each n > 1 there exists no state less than q n+1 for which the buyer selects an offer acceptable to seller types in the interval [q n , 1]. We use this property extensively in the proof of our characterization theorem in Section 5 (Theorem 3). Secondly, in the private values case, the buyer's expected surplus R(q) is decreasing in q. Assumption 1 then guarantees that R(q) > 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1]. This property allows the extension process to terminate in a finite number of steps (for a precise argument, see Ausubel and Deneckere, 1989 , Lemma 2).
When valuations are positively related, however, R(q) may be increasing in q over some interval, so it is quite conceivable that the extension procedure might never terminate. Our proof makes essential use the maximality of the extension to establish that this cannot happen : bargaining always ends in a finite number of rounds. While Theorem 1 guarantees that bargaining will end in a finite number of periods, there is a big difference with the private values case. When values are private, the number of bargaining rounds remains bounded above as the discount factor approaches 1 (see Deneckere, 1992) . With interdependent values, this property cannot generally hold. Otherwise, the Coase Conjecture would always apply, and according to Lemma 1 this is impossible whenever E(v(q)) < c(1). Under the latter assumption, the number of bargaining rounds must necessarily increase without bound as the discount factor approaches 1.
Our second result establishes existence of stationary equilibrium under extremely weak conditions. We drop Assumption 2, and replace Assumption 1 with the much weaker condition :
Our technique of proof consists of approximating v(·) and c(·) by functions that satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, and arguing that an appropriate chosen limit of the stationary equilibria of the approximating games is a stationary equilibrium of the limit game. This generalizes Ausubel and Deneckere (1989, Theorem 4.2) to the case of interdependent values.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Then there exists a stationary equilibrium.
22 Vincent (1989, Theorem 1) adapts Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson's (1986) arguments to establish existence under Assumptions 1 and 2, but his proof fails to demonstrate that the extension does not get stuck at some state q > 0.
Our proof also dispenses with Vincent's requirement that v(·) be nondecreasing.
Characterizing the limiting equilibrium path
In this section, we will use the results of Section 4 to characterize the limiting delay whenever the buyer's and seller's valuation function are neoclassical, 23 i.e. :
Assumption 4 v (·) and c (·) are step functions, each having at most a finite number of steps.
To describe the limiting revenue and acceptance functions, let us set q * 0 = 1, p * 0 = c (1), and iteratively define
whenever the set in (9) is nonempty, and q * n = 0 otherwise, and
ending the process whenever q * n reaches 0. Note that Assumptions 1 and 4 guarantee that this happens in a finite number of steps. Let us denote this number by K. In order to simplify the proofs, we also make the following nondegeneracy assumption. For each n ∈ {1, ..., K − 1} let us also define T n as the solution to e −rTn = ρ 2 n , where
The intuition behind the above construction is analogous to the intuition for the limiting solution in the two-step example of Section 3. LetR (q) andP (q) respectively denote the buyer's expected revenue and the seller's acceptance function, in the limit as the length of the time period between successive offers converges to zero (our proofs below show that these limits are well defined, with the possible exception ofP (q * n ), which is defined by makingP left-continuous revenue function converge to : 
Note that by Lemma A-2 we have P (q) = c (1), for all q ≥ q 1 , regardless of the length of time between periods, soq is well defined. Our next lemma shows thatq = q * 1 , i.e. that the buyer's limiting revenue is equal toR (q) for all q ≥ q * 1 , and that the seller's limiting acceptance function is equal to p * In the above example, it is feasible for trade to occur at the price c(1), but because q * 1 > 0 the limiting bargaining outcome exhibits real delay (see Corollary 1). In order for there not to be any limiting delay, the condition E(v) ≥ c(1) therefore generally needs to be strengthened. 
E(v) ≥ c(1)
is equivalent to the condition of Corollary 2, and hence both necessary and sufficient for the absence of delay.
Our remaining task is to determine the extent of the equilibrium delay when q * 1 > 0.
26 As we saw in Section 3, determining this delay is equivalent to finding the limiting acceptance price of type q * 1 .
Theorem 3 implies that c(·) can have at most M jumps (M < ∞), and hence that P (·) can have at most M jumps in the interior of any interval (q n , q n−1 ]. We show that any such jumps can persist for at most an arbitrarily small amount of real time when δ is sufficiently large. Now because q * 1 > 0 there is real delay at q * 1 . There will therefore exist a neighborhood of q * 1 such that whenever δ is sufficiently large there are no inner jumps in P (·). As a consequence, when the state is q n+1 the buyer will be indifferent between inducing the state q n and the state q n+1 . It is this property which allows us to estimate the a relationship between m n and m n+1 , in a fashion analogous to the two-type case (see the derivations leading up to equation (7)), and therefore to calculate the limiting delay at q * 1 .
The efficiency of sequential bargaining
Suppose that the condition of Lemma 1 is violated, so that we necessarily have q * 1 > 0. We would like to know whether the limiting solution described in the previous section is then ex-ante efficient, i.e. maximizes the gains from trade over all incentive compatible and individually rational trading outcomes. To see that this cannot generally be the case, let us first consider the two-type example zero at the price sρ 2 instead. Indeed, all such seller types are indifferent between these two options, and the buyer pays the same discounted price, but gets to trade earlier.
27
The two-type example gives a clear and unambiguous answer, but leaves open the possibility that for more general type distributions the limiting bargaining mechanism might sometimes achieve the constrained welfare optimum. We will now slightly alter the argument from the two-type case to demonstrate that this is never the case. Indeed, under Assumptions 4 and 5 there exists an Ever since Ronald Coase's (1972) famous paper, a central tenet of bargaining theory has been that a player's inability to commit to walking away from the bargaining table may not only seriously undermine her bargaining power, but may also enhance the efficiency of the bargaining outcome. In other words, the welfare distortions are lower when the uninformed party lacks commitment power than when she has perfect commitment power. We claim that when values are interdependent, this conclusion may be reversed. To see this, let us again consider the two-type example studied in Section 3, and let us assume that the fraction of high valuation seller types is sufficiently small that q * 1 > 0, i.e.q > β/(s + β − α). Amongst all incentive compatible mechanisms, the one 27 In the resulting mechanism, the buyer will enjoy strictly positive expected surplus; this means we can increase the probability of trade on the interval (q, 1] above ρ 2 , thereby further increasing welfare. We can maintain incentive compatibility by raising the price paid by seller types in [0,q] in such a way as to keep them indifferent between the two options. The ex-ante optimal mechanism obtains when the probability of trade over the interval [0,q] cannot be raised any further without making the buyer sustain losses. most preferred by the buyer is the one in which she gets to make a single take-it-or-leave-it offer (see Samuelson (1984) ). Since there are relatively few high valuation seller types, the buyer's optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer is equal to zero. Under perfect commitment power social welfare therefore coincides with the buyer's expected revenue, i.e. equals αq. At the same time, the limiting bargaining outcome from Section 3 has trade occur immediately with seller types in [0, q * 1 ], and with delay discounted to ρ 2 with seller types in (q * 1 , 1]. In the absence of commitment power, welfare therefore equals αq *
e. falls short of welfare under perfect commitment! Intuitively, this can happen because with relatively few high valuation types the inefficiencies associated with ordinary monopsony power are smaller than the inefficiencies caused by the Coase Conjecture forces.
Our welfare analysis also applies to the reverse bargaining model in which the buyer is the informed party, and the seller makes all the offers. To see this, let us assume that types are ordered such that v(·) is a non-increasing function, so that it can be interpreted as a demand curve.
28 Assumption 2 then becomes : there exists
In a stationary equilibrium, the buyer adopts a stationary acceptance strategy, accepting the offer p when his signal is q if and only if p ≤ P (q). The seller's value function R(q) must then satisfy a dynamic programming equation analogous to (2):
Let t(q) be the minimum element from the argmax correspondence associated with (13); the buyer's acceptance function must then satisfy the indifference equation :
By analogy, we may define
, and similarly for {q * n , p * n } when n > 1. With these definitions, all of our results apply immediately. case, there is a delay for a length of time discounted to ρ 2 , where
, and so on.
Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a bilateral trading situation, in which there is one-sided incomplete information. We analyzed the infinite-horizon bargaining game in which the uninformed party makes all the offers, but departed from the standard model by allowing valuations to be interdependent.
We showed that the Coase conjecture forces are still very much operative, but that there may be limiting delay, at states for which the uninformed party's limiting expected payoff vanishes. Under these circumstances, when the discount factor is sufficiently large, bargaining will characterized by short periods with substantial likelihood of agreement, followed by long periods with very low probability of agreement. Such delay may occur even if the static incentive and individual rationality constraints permit an efficient outcome to be obtained, unless additional regularity conditions are imposed. We also demonstrated that when the static incentive constraints do not permit first best efficiency, then from a welfare viewpoint the limiting bargaining outcome displays "excessive delay."
The inability of the bargaining game in which the uninformed party makes all the offers to replicate the ex-ante efficient outcome opens up an interesting avenue for future research. Indeed, other institutions may then yield superior outcomes. This could help explain why parties sometimes resort to other mechanisms, such as arbitration. Even staying strictly within the framework of infinite horizon bargaining, interesting questions arise. For example, it is a well accepted wisdom that in order to promote efficiency in bargaining, the power should go the party that has the private information. Ausubel and Deneckere (1989b) 
Q.E.D.
The intuition behind Lemma A-1 is straightforward. When the buyer raises output marginally from y < 1, the increased acceptance probability raises her expected payoff by at least ∆. The cost associated with raising output is that all seller types who would have accepted previously will now be receiving a higher offer. When q approaches 1, the number of such seller types becomes arbitrarily small, so raising output will be profitable unless the rate at which the offer must be increased is unbounded. Assumption 2 prevents this from happening.
Define S(q) = arg max π(y; q) and let q 1 = inf{q : 1 ∈ S(q)}; the previous result implies that q 1 < 1. Lemma A-2 shows that when the state exceeds q 1 and there is more one bargaining period remaining, the buyer will still "clear the market" by making the offer p = c(1). This is not obvious, (Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole, 1985, Lemma 2) , the seller will accept any such price with probability one. This implies that the buyer's (ex-ante) equilibrium continuation payoff is bounded below by π (1; q) . At the same time, Samuelson (1984) has shown that the optimal static mechanism for the buyer involves a take-it-and-leave-if offer to the seller. Consequently, Lemma A-1 implies that in any sequential equilibrium, after any history in which it is her turn to move, the most the buyer can expect as a continuation payoff is π (1; q) . Combining both results, we see that the buyer's equilibrium continuation payoff equals π(1; q), and is uniquely attained by offering p = c(1), which the seller accepts.
Lemma A-2 yields a unique candidate stationary triplet (R, t, P ) on the interval [q 1 , 1] :
This is the easiest to see when q > q 1 , for then (A-1) reduces to t(q) = 1 and R(q) = π(1; q), as required by Lemma A-2. Furthermore, if contrary to the equilibrium the seller is offered a price p < c(1), he will expect the buyer to return with the counteroffer c(1) in the next period, and therefore will accept p iff p ≥ (1 − δ)c(q) + δc(1), as indicated in (A-1). The same argument applies at q = q 1 if t (q 1 ) = 1. Meanwhile, if t(q 1 ) < 1, application of equation 3, and using the fact that t(q 1 ) > q 1 , yields the stated formula for P (q 1 ). That (A-1) is a stationary triplet is shown in the next lemma.
Lemma A-3 Consider the triplet defined in (A-1). Then R(q)
, and c = lim ε↓0 c (q + ε). By Assumption 1, we have w ≥ c + ∆.
Consequently, there exists ε > 0 such that v (q ) > c (q + ε) for all q ∈ (q, q + ε) . The definition of
By the definition of q 1 , we know that t (q) = 1 for all q > q 1 , so that (A-1) yields P (q) =
(1 − δ) c (q) + δc (1) . Furthermore, R(q) > 0 implies that we must have t(q 1 ) > q 1 . Hence, for all
The one before last equality follows from the fact that max y≥q { y q
Proof of Theorem 1 : Given a stationary triplet on the interval [q n , 1], we extend it in a unique way to a stationary triplet on a larger interval [q n+1 , 1] . For q ∈ [0, 1], let R 1 (q) be the buyer's profit when constrained to select the state in [q n , 1], and let Υ 1 be the corresponding argmax correspondence:
Also, extend P (q) to the entire interval [0, 1] by setting P 1 (q) = (1 − δ)c(q) + δP (t 1 (q)), where t 1 (q) = min Υ 1 (q). Next, for q ∈ [0, q n ] let R 2 (q) denote the buyer's profit when constrained to select the state in [q, q n ] (using the extended acceptance function):
Finally, define q n+1 = max {q ≥ 0 : R 1 (q) ≤ R 2 (q)} whenever the latter set is nonempty, and
We now claim that q n+1 < q n . To see this, note that R 2 (q n ) = δR 1 (q n ) < R 1 (q n ), and that by the theorem of the maximum R 1 and R 2 are continuous functions.
, and t(q n+1 ) = t 2 (q n+1) . We also claim that (P, t, R) is a stationary triplet on [q n+1 , 1]. To show this, we need to establish that for any q ∈ [q n+1 , q n ) it is the case that R 1 (q) = max y∈ [q,1] y q (v(z) − P (y))dz + δR 1 (y). But if the maximizer y ∈ [q, q n ), we would have R 1 (q) = R 2 (q), contradicting the definition of q n+1 .
Consequently, y ∈ [q n , 1] and the required equality holds by construction.
Next, we claim that R (q n+1 ) > 0. Lett (q) = max Υ (q), and let ε be such that q + ε ∈ (q,t (q)).
Sincet (q) is feasible from the state q + ε, we have
Since q + ε is feasible from q, we also have
Plugging (A-2) into (A-3) yields
As shown in the proof of Lemma A-3, the first term under the integrand is bounded away from 0 for sufficiently small ε. We will have proven the claim if we can show that lim ε↓0 (P (t(q+ )−P (t(q)) = 0.
Since Υ (q) is a nondecreasing continuous correspondence, we have lim ε↓0 t(q +ε) =t(q). The above equality can therefore fail only if P (·) has a discontinuity att (q). However, if this is the case, we necessarily have t (q + ε) =t (q) when ε is sufficiently small. Otherwise the buyer could selectt(q) when the state is q + ε, thereby lowering the price discontinuously, and increasing his profit.
Finally, we will show that it takes only a finite number of extensions before q n+1 reaches 0.
Suppose to the contrary that lim
, it must be the case that lim n→∞ P (q n ) = c + (q ∞ ), where c + (q) denotes the right hand limit of c (q). By Assumption 1 there exists n 0 > 0 such that ∀n > n 0
. We will show that q n − q n+1 ≥ for all n > n 0 , contradicting the assumption that {q n } converges to q ∞ . To see this, observe that
The last inequality follows because
Hence we have,
where the last inequality follows again from the monotonicity of
Appendix B : Proof of Theorem 2
Consider a sequence ∆ n > 0 such that ∆ n ↓ 0, and a sequence q n < 1 such that q n ↑ 1. For each n, define v n (q) = v(q) + ∆ n , and c n (q) = c(q) for q ≤ q n , and c n (
q−qn 1−qn , for q > q n . Observe that the game with valuation functions {v n (·), c n (·)} satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1, and so has a stationary triplet {R n , P n , t n }.
Since [0, 1] is compact, it follows from Prohorov's Theorem (Billingsley, 1968, p.37 ) that the sequence P n has a weakly convergent subsequence (more precisely, Prohorov proves this for the right continuous versions of P n , but the result is obviously true if we take left continuous versions instead). By taking this subsequence, and renumbering indices, we may without loss of generality assume that the original sequence {P n } is weakly convergent. Thus, P n converges "in distribution"
to a left-continuous nondecreasing function P (q), i.e. P n (q) → P (q) at every point q where P (·) is continuous.
Next, we claim that each R n is Lipschitz continuous, with Lipschitz constantv + c(1) + ∆ n .
Indeed, we know that R n (·) is continuous and that its left-hand derivative, R
, exists and is bounded byv +c(1)+∆ n . Using reasoning analogous to the proof of the mean value theorem, we obtain that for any two values
This in turn implies that {R n } is an equicontinuous family of functions, and hence has a subsequence which converges uniformly to a continuous limit R. Again, by taking a further subsequence if necessary, we may assume that the original sequence converges to R.
δR(q )}. Because P n converges "in distribution" to P , and R n converges uniformly to R, the hypotheses of the Generalized Theorem of the Maximum (Ausubel and Deneckere, 1989, p. 527) are satisfied. Since for each n we have
(2) holds.
It remains to be shown that (3) is also satisfied. Consider any q ∈ [0, 1) where t(·), P (·), and P (t(·)) are continuous. Since each of these functions is nondecreasing, at most countably many q are excluded. We will first argue that for such q equation (3) must hold. Observe first that since q is a continuity point of P (·), we have lim n→∞ P n (q) = P (q). Secondly, since c n (·) converges uniformly to c(·), we have lim n→∞ c n (q) = c(q). Thirdly, the Generalized Theorem of the Maximum implies that any cluster point of {t n (q)} belongs to Υ(q). Since t(·) is continuous at q, Υ(·) is single-valued at q, and hence lim n→∞ t n (q) = t(q). Finally, let p be any accumulation point of the sequence {P n (t n (q))}. We claim that p = P (t(q)). First, let us show that p ≥ P (t(q)). To this effect, let r k ↑ t(q) and s k ↓ t(q) be sequences of continuity points of P (·). Then for all k, there exists N (k)
for all n ≥ N (k). Since r k and s k are continuity points of P (·), it follows upon taking limits as
Exploiting left-continuity of P (·), and again taking limits as k → ∞, we then obtain P (t(q)) ≤ p ≤ lim s↓t(q) P (s). Secondly, suppose that contrary to the claim we have p > P (t(q)). We will show that for large n this contradicts that t n (q) is a profit-maximizing choice for the buyer. Indeed, observe that
. Now letting n = N (k), and letting k → ∞, we see that the above expression converges to [p − P (t(q))][t(q) − q]. Next, we claim that t(q) > q, showing that for large k the choice r k dominates the choice t N (k) (q), the desired contradiction. Indeed, suppose to the contrary that t(q) = q. Then there must exist ε > 0 such
contradicting continuity of the function P (t(·)) at q. Now let q ∈ (q, q + ε) be a continuity point of t (·). Then since t n (q ) ≥ q for every n, we would obtain the contradiction q = t (q ) = lim n→∞ t n (q ) ≥ q , so we must have t (q) > q. We conclude that lim n→∞ P n (t n (q)) = P (t(q)).
Now observe that since {P n , R n , t n } is a stationary triplet, we have for each n :
By taking limits as n → ∞, we see that (3) must hold for all but at most a countable number of q. Finally, consider any of the excluded q ∈ [0, 1], and select as sequence of nonexcluded q k such that q k ↑ q. Since (3) holds for all k, and since the functions P n (·), c n (·), and P n (t n (·)) are all left-continuous, we see upon taking limits as k → ∞ that (3) also holds at q. We conclude that
{P (·), R(·), t(·)} is a stationary triplet for the game with valuations functions v(·) and c(·). Q.E.D.

Appendix C : Characterization of the Limit
Lemma C-1 For any ε > 0, there exists a finite integer N and a constant η > 0 such that
Combining the outer inequalities then yields :
v . SinceR(q) is continuous and strictly positive over [q *
exists and is strictly greater than 0. Hence, t(q) − q is uniformly bounded from below by η = d v . Let N be the smallest integer greater than
Proof of Lemma 2 : First, we claim thatq ≥ q * 1 . If q * 1 = 0, the inequality is trivial, so suppose that q * 1 > 0. Observe that since for all q >q we have lim δ→1 P (q) = c(1), it is the case thatR (q) = φ (q) for all q >q, where φ (q) = Next, we show thatq ≤ q * 1 . Suppose to the contrary we hadq > q * 1 . Select any q ∈ (q * 1 ,q). From Lemma C-1, we know that it takes at most a finite periods for the buyer to offer price c (1) regardless of δ. This impliesP (q ) = c(1), which contradicts to the definition ofq.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1 :
It remains to be shown that there can be no limiting delay at q * 1 = 0, i.e. thatP (0) = c(1). Suppose to the contrary that lim inf δ→1 P δ (0) = b < c(1). In the generic case where R(0) > 0, selectq 1 ∈ (0, 1) and define q = 0. The second part of the proof of Lemma 2 now applies literally, withq 1 taking the place ofq, yielding the desired contradiction.
Next, let R(0) = 0. Define N (ζ) be the smallest index such that q N (ζ) ≤ 0. We will show that lim ζ→0 N (ζ)ζ = 0, which then impliesP (0) = c(1). Observe that q 1 > 0, for q 1 = 0 would imply that N (ζ) = 1, which completes the proof. It therefore follows from the definition of q 1 that if Hence, applying the definition of R and the inequality P (q) ≤ (1 − δ)c(q) + δc (1), we obtain
Hence for any ε < x, it takes at most n (δ) periods to move from state 0 to state ε, where n(δ) is the smallest integer greater than , there exists δ 0 < 1 such that for all δ ≥ δ 0 , n 1 (ε, δ) satisfying δ n1 = 1 − ε, and n 2 (δ) satisfying δ n 2 = ρ, we have q n ∈ (q * 1 − ε 1 , q * 1 + ε 1 ) for all n satisfying n 1 ≤ n ≤ n 2 + 1.
2. Show that for sufficiently large δ, we have t(q) = q n−1 for all q ∈ (q n+1 , q n ], n 1 (ε, δ) −2 ≤ n ≤n (δ), wheren (δ) = max {n : q n ≥ q 3. Similarly to the two step case, because there are no inner jumps in P (·) within any interval
, we therefore get a similar relation between the discount factor δ and m n = q n−1 − q n , i.e.
. Definen(ε, δ) to be the turning period, that is the solution to ρ(ε)δ 
Proof of
Step 1 : First, given ε > 0 and δ n1 = 1 − ε, we have
The inequality c (q 1 ) < c (1) follows from the definition of q 1 = inf{q : t(q) = 1}. Otherwise, by the left continuity of c (·), and Assumption 4 we can find q < q 1 such that c (q) = c(1) for all q ∈ (q , 1].
This would imply t(q ) = 1, yielding a contradiction. SinceP (q * 1 + ε 1 ) = c (1), there exists a δ 0 such that for all δ > δ 0 , P (q n1 ) < P (q * 1 + ε 1 ). Hence, we obtain q n1 < q * 1 + ε 1 . Secondly, from the proof of Theorem 1, we know that R(q) > 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Hence,
The second inequality uses the fact that
Step 2 : We first prove that if there are M steps in c(·) over the interval (q n , 1] ⊂ (q * 1 , 1], then there are at most M steps in P (q) for q ∈ (q n , q n−1 ] ⊂ (q * 1 , 1]. For n = 1, since P (q) = (1 − δ) c (q) + δc (1), P and c have the same number of steps for q ∈ (q 1 , 1]. Suppose the statement is true for n ≥ 1, i.e. c(·) has M steps in (q n, 1] and P (·) has at most M steps in (q n , q n−1 ]. Now suppose c (·) has M steps for q ∈ (q n+1, 1]. Then c (·) has M − M steps for q ∈ (q n+1, q n ].
Note that P (q) = (1 − δ) c (q) + δP (t (q)) and t(q) ∈ (q n, q n−1 ] for q ∈ (q n+1 , q n ]. Hence, if q is a discontinuity point of P , then q is either a discontinuity point of c(·) or of P (t(·)), or of both. Since t(·) is increasing, P (t(q)) can have at most M discontinuity points for q ∈ (q n+1, q n ]. Furthermore, since c(·) and P (t(·)) are increasing, there are at most
LetM denote the number of discontinuity points of c(·) on [q *
, the number of the inner jumps in P (·) over (q n+1, q n ] is bounded byM and is nonincreasing in n for n strictly less thann and satisfying q n < q * 1 + ε 0 . We will show that there are no more inner jumps in P (·) by the time we reach q n1 , i.e. δ n1 = 1 − ε. The argument goes as
From the argument of Step 1, we know q n0 ∈ (q n1 , q * 1 + ε 0 ) and there are at mostM inner jumps in P over (q n0+1 , q n0 ]. Secondly, suppose that after n 0 periods m inner jumps persist. Let n 0 (δ, ε ) be the solution of δ n 0 −n 0 = 1 − ε . We will show that after n 0 periods at least one inner jump collapses. By applying this argument till all the inner jumps disappear, we know it takes at most n 1 (δ, ε ) periods, where n 1 (δ, ε ) is the solution of δ
sufficiently large δ we have n 1 < n 1 − 2. Therefore we can conclude that there are no inner jumps in the seller's acceptance function for all q in (qn, q n1−2 ]. Hence, to complete the proof, we only need to show that if there are m steps in P (q) for q ∈ (q n0+1 , q n0 ], then there are at most m − 1
Suppose two adjacent intervals (q n+1, q n ] and (q n+2, q n+1 ] have the same number of discontinuity points in P (·), denoted by m. Let (q n, 1 , q n,2 , . . . , q n,m ) and (q n+1, 1 , q n+1,2 , . . . , q n+1,m ) denote those discontinuity points, and define x n = (x n,1 , x n,2 , . . . , x n,m ), where x n,i = q n,i − q n,i−1 for i = 2, · · · , m, and x n,1 = q n,1 − q n+1 . We first show that there is a linear mapping A n such that
Since c(·) is constant over (q n+2, q n+1 ], the jumps in P requires the jumps in t(·). We 
, where
, we obtain a linear mapping
Hence we may rewrite (C-3) as 
We will show that there exists a δ a ∈ (0, 1) such that for δ ∈ ∆ m (a ) ∩ (δ a , 1) and n > n 0 (δ, ε ), at least one element in x n becomes negative, i.e., at least one inner jump collapses. Let δ 0 = max{δ a : a ∈ C 1 × C 2 × · · · × C m }. Since there are only finitely possible a , we know δ 0 exists and is strictly less than 1. Applying the argument for all possible a , we conclude that for δ ∈ (δ 0 , 1), at least one inner jump collapses for n > n 0 . This then completes the proof of Step 2. Henceforth, we therefore only consider the case where
Let a i (ε ) = (1 − ε )a i . By (C-5) we have : 
From Claim 2(a) below, without loss of generality we have
, e i the ith unit vector in R m , and select α i such that e m = m i=1 α i v i . Then using (C-4), (C-6) and (C-7) we have
From (C-8) and (C-9), we have
For any k and any two vectors x(δ), y (δ) ∈ R k , define x ≈ y if lim δ→1 xi yi = 1 for i = 1, . . . , k. Using (C-10), Claim 1 below establishes that x n+1 ≈ r n+1,1 v 1 for some n < n 0 (δ, ε ). Therefore from Claim 2(b) below, we obtain the desired result that for sufficiently large δ at least one element in x n+1 becomes negative for some n less than n 0 .
29 By slightly modifying the proof, we get the same result when some eigenvalues have the same absolute values or when they are complex numbers.
Step 3 : We first prove that n 1 <n < n 2 + 1, implying q * 1 − ε 1 < qn < q n1 ≤ q * 1 + ε 1 according to Step 1. It then follows that q n 1 −qn < 2ε 1 , so that q n1 −2(q n1 −qn) > q n1 −4ε 1 > q * 1 −ε 0 . From Step 1 we know that δ n 2 +1 = δρ < δρ(ε) ≤ δn. Hencen < n 2 + 1. Observe also that lim ε→0 P (q n1 ) = c(1), lim ε→0 ρ (ε) = ρ < 1 and lim ε→0 δ n1 = 1. Hence for sufficiently small ε we have δn < δ n1 orn > n 1 .
Secondly, we show that theP (q * 1 ) = p * 1 . We do this in 3 steps :
Step 3.1 : Show that ∃ δ 1 ≥ δ 0 and n 2 (ε, δ) such that n 2 (ε, δ) >n(ε, δ) > n 1 (ε, δ) and such that ∀δ > δ 1 , we have m n2(ε,δ) ∈ ((1 − ε)m n1(ε,δ) , m n1(ε,δ) ]. Show furthemore that this implies that the total delay in [q n2−1 , q n1 ], (n 2 (ε, δ) − n 1 (ε, δ) − 2)ζ, converges to T, where T satisfies
From the analogue to Equation (8) [ψ (ζ, n 2 )] 1 n 2 (ζ)−n 1 = 1 − ε, implying that lim ζ→0 ζ(n 2 − n 1 − 2) = T .
Step 3 In the proof of Step 2, we have shown that for n = N, . . . , n 1 , x n+1 = A n (δ, n 0 )x n , lim δ→0 A n (δ, n 0 ) = A (ε ) and that we need at mostM pairs of (n 0 , ε ) to kill off all inner jumps. For each pair of (n 0 , ε ), Equations (C-5) and (C-6) imply that we can rewrite A n (δ, n 0 ) = δ −n (1 + O(1 − δ N ))A for n = N, . . . , n 1 , where A is one of finitely many possible linear mappings. Hence, there exists a sufficiently large j ∈ Z, such that for sufficiently large δ, we have (C-12)
Note that by Step 3, we haveP (q * 1 ) = p * 1 . Hence,q is well defined. Similarly to the argument in Lemma 2, we can show thatq = q * 2 , i.e. that the buyers limiting revenue is equal toR (q) for all q ≥ q * 2 , and that the seller's limiting acceptance function is equal to p * 1 on the interval (q * 2 , q * 1 ].
Q.E.D.
Proof of Claims 1-3
Claim 1 x n+1 ≈ r n+1,1 v 1 for some n 0 < n < n 0 (δ, ε ). Using (C-14), β (x n0 ) ≈ r n0,2 and β(x n+1 ) ≈ λ n−n0 2 r n0,2 , we obtain
Since r n,1 = γ n α 1 (1−κ n )β(x n ) for all n = n 0 +N , . . . , n 0 +2N and λ1 λ2 > 1, we have ( . Combining this with (C-10) we obtain γ n+1 ≤ γ n for all n > n 0 + 2N . Select ε ∈ (0, ε ) such that λ1−ε λ2−ε > 1. Let n (δ, ε , ε ) be the solution of δ n −n0 = ε < ε . Since lim δ→1 (1 − κ n ) = ε , by a similar argument as above (let n take the role of n 0 and replace N with 0) we have
Since γ n + 
